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IN the Soviet Union, household money (currency) is differen- ment, and the
tiated from enterprise money (bank deposits), and household share of net ou
banking from enterprise banking. All payments are separated into size of the wag
these two different circuits, which correspond to the separate such as stipend
markets for consumer goods and producers' goods.' Their focal personal taxes
point is the State Bank, whose staff (particularly at the local matching these
branch level) devotes much of its time to their management. A of individual ei
further institutional separation of the flow of payments under the Separation o
standard system was the assignment to the State Bank of all planning as we
payments relating to current production, while the accumulation resources
and disbursement of all funds relating to fixed capital formation in goods and serv
the state-owned sector went on the books of the Investment facilitates detec
Bank. of economic
The difference between the two kinds of money is both physical the range of go
and functional. For the population at large, currency alone serves guide future pr
as medium of payment, except for a relatively small amount of ties' control o
payments via savings accounts. By contrast, all payments among After the about
enterprises, economic and civic organizations, and government in 1947 by the
'agencies (except for petty cash disbursements) involve deposit availableopti4
transfers on the books of the banking system. Currency and acquired a hig
deposit money are not interchangeable. Deposits are exchanged limited by the.
for currency almost exclusively through payroll withdrawals. produced and 1
Separation of payments flows, in the Soviet Union as well as in consumer
other socialist countries, is a basic mechanism for avoiding excess ity of options
nature of thes
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demand. A necessary condition for macroeconomic equilibrium
in the household sector is that the amount of income paid out
equal the value (at set prices) of all goods and services available
for household consumption plus voluntary household savings.
The total bill for consumer goods is determined by the combined
effect of output plans, factory prices, and the turnover tax appli-
cable to each product. Turnover taxes are differentiated by prod-
uct, and are designed to raise prices for consumer items suffi-
ciently to prevent effective demand from exceeding available
supplies.
Once the major macroeconomic decisions are made concerning
the apportionment of the social product between private con-
sumption, on the one hand, and collective consumption, invest-
ment, and the cost of general administration, on the other, the
share of net output earmarked for the population determines the
size of the wage fund (after allowing for other sources of income,
such as stipends and pensions, as well as for the small amount of
personal taxes paid by the population). To achieve the goal of
matching these two magnitudes, wage rates and total payroll costs
of individual enterprises are strictly controlled.
Separation of payments into two circuits facilitates financial
planning as well as central accounting control over the flow of
resources within the socialized sector and prevents leakages of
goods and services from there into private consumption. It also
facilitates detection of bottlenecks and shortfalls in the execution
of economic plans. Finally, it gives consumers some choice within
the range of goods and services offered by planners (which may
guide future production), while preserving the planning authori-
ties' control over inputs and outputs in the enterprise sector.
After the abolition of wartime rationing, which was made possible
in 1947 by the increased flow of consumer goods, the range of
available options widened and household money gradually
acquired a higher degree of "moneyness." Options have been
limited by the planners' choice of the "assortment" of goods
produced and by the lack of a workable mechanism to feed back
consumer preferences into production planning. While availabil-
ity of options does not guarantee rational choices, the limited
nature of these. options prevents the system from developing
procedures for evaluating preferences and demand elasticities.Th 78 Payments and Financial Flows
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for a relatively small amount paid directly into savings accounts.
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Through currency withdrawals, note liabilities are substituted require adjustme
on the books of the State Bank for liabilities to enterprises and to sector.
the Treasury: thus, creditor balances are reduced to only a frac- The bulk of th
tion of loans. Indeed, because of cumulative currency withdraw-
I currencyreturnij
als resulting from the continuous increase in aggregate loan vol- purchases as ser
ume, deposit balances of enterprises at the end of 1969 were equal
I theirsavings acá
to only about one-tenth of their aggregate loan balances. or service estabi
Collectivized farmers now receive a very large part of their all currency rec
income in cash, but prior to 1953 payments in kind were preva- cash.
lent. The remonetization of relations between the kolkhozes and Prompt recov
the state, and the subsequent changeover of the members' remu- circulation as pc
neration from an annual distribution on the basis of work per- tary managemen
formed to periodic money payments, have increased the circula-
I sumersfrom
tion of currency as well as its rate of turnover among the rural market and other
population. Members of collective farms and workers on state
I ofspending that
farms, as well as the small number of independent farmers still in emphasis is plac
existence, also receive currency through direct sales of crops and service establish
animal products from their privately farmed plots, possible and on
Consumer goods and services are obtained almost entirely from establishments,
state-owned retail stores (the network of "cooperative stores" in to hold. Any
villagesis,de facto, state-operated).2 As a result, currency
I ("operational
normally returns to the State Bank after only one transaction—
I lated maximum when currency paid out as wages is spent in retail stores and is "general reserve redeposited by them—but some part changes hands within the only on specific
population itself, with one group purchasing goods from another. State Bank. Con In addition to the free-market sales of farm products, such trans- vent issuance of
actions include sales by artisans and cooperative producers, sales except in strict c of second-hand goods, and payments for services to domestics
and other individuals (including moonlighters) and for various
forms of illicit transactions. Of all these transactions, farm prod- THE DEPOSIT
2Capital goodscannotbe acquired by the population at large, but a limited amount of The deposit tn
building materials has become available in recent years for repair purposes and new nology)
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ucts purchased directly from the rural population are by far the
most important. Farmers use the proceeds of their sales to the
urban population toacquire goods and services from the
socialized sector. As long as claims on the socialized sector are
merely transferred from one group of the population to another,
few problems arise for planners and controllers of currency
flows, even though the resulting shifts in the structure of demand
require adjustments in the bill of goods produced for the consumer
sector.
The bulk of the demand for currency is met from the supply of
currency returning to the monobank when individuals make retail
purchases as service expenditures, pay income taxes, and add to
their savings accounts. State-owned and cooperative retail stores
or service establishments are required to make daily deposits of
all currency receipts in excess of a stipulated amount of petty
cash.
Prompt recovery of as large an amount of currency put into
circulation as possible is one of the shibboleths of Soviet mone-
tary management. Continuous efforts are made to prevent con-
sumers from hoarding currency which might spill over into black
market and other illicit activities and make possible sudden surges
of spending that typically create shortages in retail stores. Much
emphasis is placed on channeling the cash receipts of trade and
service establishments into State Bank offices as promptly as
possible and on minimizing the amount of till cash that such
establishments, as well as industrial establishments, are permitted
to hold. Any inflow of currency that results in vault cash holdings
("operational reserves") at a local bank office in excess of stipu-
lated maximum levels is transferred to the centrally controlled
"general reserves," from which notes and coins can be released
only on specific orders from the head or regional offices of the
State Bank. Conversely, elaborate precautions are taken to pre-
vent issuance of currency to enterprises and government units
except in strict conformity with the cash plan.
THE DEPOSIT TRANSFER CIRCUIT
The deposit transfer circuit ("noncash circuit," in Soviet termi-
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Ldisposition of the gross national income not paid out in currency
to the population, as well as transactions relating to the extension
and repayment of credit.3 (Only payments up to a small specified
amount—currently 100 rubles—may be made in currency.) Trade
organizations are authorized, in strictly circumscribed situations,
to make cash payments for certain direct purchases made locally,
and state procurement agencies pay for their purchases from
kolkhozes largely in currency. With those minor exceptions, only
amounts needed for meeting payrolls can be converted into
currency.
The deposit transfer mechanism is designed to place payments
between economic units on a semi-automatic basis while assuring
prompt fulfillment of all obligations to the state budget. A
primary task of the banking system is to provide a smooth deposit
transfer mechanism that will promptly return to every enterprise
all working capital spent in producing the output delivered to the
next link in the chain, and to provide credit for bridging any
payment gaps.
Claims among socialist enterprises arising from production and
distribution give rise only to settlements through deposit transfers
between the accounts of the buyer and the seller, or through
mutual offsetting of claims. Payments are made as goods move
through production and distribution channels for purposes deter-
mined by the planners according to rigid schedules.
Goods must normally be paid for, in accordance with a fixed
time schedule, shortly after documentary drafts (the main means
of settlement) are received by the purchasers. One of the fre-
quently criticized aspects of this procedure is that (particularly
where shipments to distant points are involved) the buyer's
account is sometimes debited before he has received and exam-
ined the shipment. Monthly or other periodic billing has not been
used until recently; hence each individual transaction requires a
separate payment to facilitate control.4
3The use of deposit transfers is obligatory for the socialized sector only. Kolkhozesare
obliged to use them in their dealings with the budget, with state-owned enterprises, and
with the credit system, and for all accounts related to capital formation which they must
keep at the State Bank, but otherwise they may use currency and keep their cash assets
either in currency or in savings accounts. Although great efforts are made to induce
ko!khozestobank their cash receipts, only 20 to 70 percent of such receipts, depending on
the region, are actually deposited.
4The requirement that each freight bill be settled separately on receipt illustrates the
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Also, for certaincategoriesof transactions, specified payments
instruments are prescribed, while in other cases the payer has a
choice. But as a rule, the nature of the transaction and the
location of the parties involved determine the way in which
payment must be made. Whatever payment instrument is used, all
typesrequiredocumentsestablishingthepurposeof the
transaction.
A variety of techniques is employed in making interenterprise
and other payments involving transfers of deposits, including
arrangements for mutual offsets of claims. These techniques grow
out of a continuous search for the best methods to combine
optimal control with speed. Arrangements frequently are different
for local and out-of-town payments.5 The form and frequency of
transfers have been changed from time to time by administrative
action aimed at specific categories of transactions, types of pay-
ments, or industries.
The use of money as a tool of administrative control as well as a
means of payment has ruled out widespread use of checks, as well
as the development of a nationwide check-clearing system (as in
the United States) or a centralized deposit transfer (giro) system
(as in most countries of Western Europe). Instead, it has created a
complex and cumbersome payment system in which documen-
tary drafts and other payment orders are used in preference to
checks and which requires processing a large volume of docu-
ments. In recent years, steps have been taken to automatize the
payments mechanism, but progress has been slow, partly due to
shortages in electronic equipment.
Even before the 1965 Reform, there was a growing tendency to
widen the choice of available payments instruments and proce-
dures and to let the enterprises involved agree directly on settle-
ment procedures. However, in the Soviet Union even relatively
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extreme to which the general principle is pushed. Delinquent payers are penalized for the
benefit of the payee by a fee of 0.03 percent a day for the amounts past due (only 0.01
percent before the Reform). This fee is automatically collected by the bank and credited to
the account of the payee.
'Clearing arrangements to offset counterclaims differ for local and out-of-town pay-
ments. On clearings and compensating arrangements, see Baskin and associates [101,
Boguslavskiy [14], Gindin [178], Piletskiy [67], Shenger [74], Shvarts [77], and Taflya
[83]. See also Mitel'man [194]. In the late sixties, about half of all payments were offset by
various clearing arrangements (with only residual balances credited or debited), but this
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minor changes, which elsewhere would be made routinely by
management on the advice of efficiency experts, are considered to
be of such importance that they are frequently the subject of
formal decisions by the Council of Ministers.
Delays in settling for goods occur mainly when consumer goods
reaching retail outlets are selling slowly or not at all. This is the
pointinthedeposittransfercircuitwherethegreatest
"unplanned" use is made of short-term bank credit. It takes the
form of an automatic (but not unlimited) extension of loans, either
to the seller to bridge the settlement gap, or to the purchaser to
enable him to make payment on the date due.
The volume of payments related to the production of goods is
geared in large measure to the degree of vertical integration of
industry. On the whole, the number of intermediate transactions
is presumably smaller in the Soviet Union than in the nonsocialist
industrial countries because raw materials and intermediate prod-
ucts reach manufacturers more directly and because final prod-
ucts pass through fewer stages of distribution before reaching
ultimate purchasers. Also, no debits are created by payments
related to trading in financial assets. On the other hand, the Soviet
economy generates payment flows peculiar to it, such as those
related to its budgetary system and reimbursements for various
kinds of containers—returned to shippers. Deposit transfers in
1970 amounted to nearly P!2 trillion rubles, several times the
value of GNP, just as bank debits in the United States are a
multiple of the dollar value of GNP.
Financial Flows
In the Soviet economy, financial flows arise in the course of the
central authorities' disposition of the social product (surplus
value—in Marxian terminology, that part of the gross product
that exceeds expenditures for labor, raw materials, and capital
consumption) and from credit operations. In contrast to nonso-
cialist economies, flows related to investments never represent an
exchange of money for financial assets through specialized institu-
tions or instruments, but merely deposit transfers on the books of
the State Bank and the Investment Bank.!inade routinely by
are considered to
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Financial Flows 83
Before the 1965 Reform, financial flows consisted essentially in
one-track intermediation via the unified budget, which centralized
all social income and redistributed it among the various levels of
government and the economy. Financial flows also included loans
and their repayment. The size, direction, and form of financial
flows were determined by inventory norms, the allocation of
"funded" commodities, the investment financing mechanism, et
cetera. Any changes in these arrangements were automatically
reflected in the financial flows. The amount of bank credit that
might be required to facilitate and speed up planned flows
depended on rules and regulations spelled out in considerable
detail and changed infrequently (see Chapter 6).
The financial system of the Soviet Union, as depicted in a
recent Soviet text book,6 is summarized in Figure 5.1. Some of its
components, such as social, personal, and property insurance and
finances of consumer cooperatives, are outside the scope of this
study.7 Numerous Western students of the Soviet economy, such
as R. W. Davies,8 have also constructed schematic presentations
of Soviet financial flows.
Note that the bulk of the social income, except for the growing
portion retained by enterprises since the Reform, goes into the
national budget, which distributes it to various lower-level units
of government as well as to the various ministries and other
economic organizations that undertake new investments; a
smaller portion is transferred directly to special investment
accounts of individual enterprises at the Investment Bank. Before
1965, about 90 percent of the social income was channeled
through the budget, but the Reform inaugurated a multi-channel
system of distribution of the social product, discussed more fully
in the following section.
The fact that more than half of the national income flows
through the budget—a much larger proportion than, in the United
States and other leading industrial countries—primarily reflects
two decisions made early in the development of the Soviet eco-
I
blpatov [41], P. 7.
7Textbooks on Soviet finances, including those listed in the bibliography, provide
detailed descriptions of the institutional arrangements in these areas, but availability of
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Payments and Financial FlowsFinancial Flows 85
nomic system, once the currency was stabilized and an efficient
fiscal system established. First, it was decided that the problem of
obtaining adequate financing for state-initiated investment should
be solved by direct pre-emption from the social product. Prior to
the abolition of the machine-tractor stations, even the bulk of the
fixed capital in kolkhozes was largely financed by the state. Only
producers' cooperatives (mostly engaged in handicraft produc-
tion) remained outside the area of state-planned and state-
financed investment.
Secondly, nearly all expenditures of the lower governmental
units are financed from a single, unified budget through transfers
and, to a small degree, by certain categories of revenue allocated
to them. Budget-financed expenditures, in addition to "ordinary
expenditures" typical of the budgets of nonsocialist countries,
cover the bulk of "collective consumption," which includes—in
addition to free education—health, and other services subsidies
for housing, transportation, and the like. Flows which in nonso-
cialist countries are normally channeled through separate social
insurance funds are an integral part of the Soviet budget, from
which all social security and social assistance payments are met.
The only significant financial circuits outside the budget are a
separate reserve fund for meeting casualty losses of state enter-
prises, and a nationwide state-operated personal property and life
insurance organization.
Investment, largely in plant and equipment, is a major compo-
nent of government expenditure at all levels. This constituted
before the Reform about 50 percent of the funds spent by the
central government, an average of 25 percent of the budgets of the
constituent republics, and about 30 percent of the funds of munic-
ipalities, with particularly heavy expenditures in major cities.
Municipal governments not only provide the various utilities and
public services but also operate a variety of enterprises which
supply the population with bread, milk, and other staples, as well
as with repair and similar services, which all require investment in
fixed plant.
The relative importance of the expenditures at the various
levels of government has changed over time due to administrative
reorganizations. The creation in 1957 of regional administrations
(Sovnarchoz), which placed a large number of enterprises under
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'See Chapter 6, fool
this level since enterprise profits create revenue for the supervis-
ing government unit. The subsequent reorganization, which
returned individual industries of national importance to the super-
vision of national ministries, left a larger number of enterprises of
local or regional significance under industry ministries of individ-
ual republics (or lower-echelon administrations) than before.
Thus, some decentralization was carried over into the system
now in effect. As a result, and largely because of increased
spending for the economy, the 1969 share of the republics in the
unified budget was 45 percent, as compared with about 25 percent
between 1940 and 1955, and close to 60 percent between 1959 and
1965.
Some revenues, such as the turnover tax, are apportioned
between the national budget and the budget of the republic in
which they are collected. A variety of systematic and specific
transfers of funds from higher-level to lower-level administrative
units is required to balance the budgets of some units whose
assigned fiscal resources are normally inadequate to cover all
expenditures. This typically occurs in areas where spending on
new investments is particularly heavy.
Budget receipts in 1971 reached almost 166 billion rubles, nine
times the level of 1940. The main source of budgetary receipts and
the distribution of expenditures between financing the economy
and the other main categories of expenditure are shown in Table
5.1.
Nine-tenths of the budget receipts are obtained from enter-
prises. Nearly all revenues of the state enterprises in excess of
prime costs (which, prior to the Reform, did not include the cost of
capital) are siphoned off into the budget, either by transfer of the
bulk of profits or through the collection of "turnover" (sales)
taxes which are imposed on most consumer and some producers'
goods. In 1971, the turnover tax alone accounted for 33 percent of
total budgetary receipts, even though its relative contribution has
been declining in recent years (to some degree due to an upward
revision of factory prices for producers' goods in 1966 undertaken
as part of the Reform). As late as 1950, enterprise profits provided
only a little more receipts than the turnover tax, but since 1964
they have been exceeding its contribution by a rising margin.
Periodic payments into the budget are based on estimated profits,for the supervis-
which
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The Budget of the USSR, Selected Years, 1940—1971
(in billions of rubles)
19401950 1960 1970 1971
Receipts
Turnover taxes 10.623.6 31.3 49.4 54.5
Payments from profits of state enterpnses" 2.2 4.0 18.6 54.2 55.6
Social security taxesb 0.9 2.0 3.8 8.3 8.8
Income taxes paid by kolkhozes, other
cooperative organizations and enterprises
operated by organizationsc 0.3 0.6 1.8 1.2 1.4
Individual income taxes and other receipts from
the population 0.9 3.6 5.6 12.7 13.7
Government loans 1.1 3.1 0.9 0.5 0.3
Miscellaneous 2.0 5.4 15.1 30.4 35.7
Total 18.042.3 77.1 156.7166.0
Expendiwres
Economy 5.8 15.8 34.1 74.6 80.4
Social and cultural purposes 4.1 11.7 29.4 55.9 59.4
Defense 5.7 8.3 9.3 17.9 17.9
General administration 0.7 1.4 1.1 1.7 1.8
Government loans" 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.1
Miscellaneous 0.8 3.6 8.5 4.4 0.6
Total 17.4 41.3 73.1154.6164.2
SOURCE: For 1971 [86]. p. 481; for earlier years, various earlier volumes.
NOTE: Items do not add up to totals because of receipts and expenditures not speci-
fied. Footnotes added by author.
For capital used, rents, charges against profits and remaining profits.
Paid by employers.
"Organizations" include trade unions, voluntary associations, etc.
Amortization,interest, and administrative expenditures.
and so are substantial proportions of depreciation allowances and
deductions for various special-purpose accounts (called "funds")
of the generating enterprise. They are normally made automati-
cally by the State Bank at frequent intervals (in some cases, every
five days or weekly) from the general enterprise account to which
sales proceeds are credited. If the accrual of funds in the enter-
prise's accounts is not adequate, obligatory payments into the
budget are financed through bank loans.9
"See Chapter 6, footnote 7.88 Payments and Financial Flows
The expenditures side of the unified budget plays the key role in
the redistribution of the national product. It embodies all major
macroeconomic decisions, the division of current output between
investment and consumption, the size and structure of collective
consumption, and the apportionment of public spending between
the various levels of government. The national budget thus fulfills
a most important allocative function'° with regard to investment
flows (between industry and agriculture, among manufacturing
industries, and between regions), which, in nonsocialist econo-
mies, is performed largely through the capital and credit mar-
kets." Investment expenditure, mainly for plant equipment, rose
from exactly one-third of total expenditures in 1940 to 47 percent
in 1960. They have stayed close to this level through 1972, in spite
of the much-emphasized claim that decentralization of investment
financing was one of the main objectives of the Reform.
Kolkhozes are the only sector in which virtually all financial
flows involve debtor-creditor relationships, and in which self-
investment does not involve circuitous routing via the budget and
its agent, the Investment Bank. Indeed, since the agricultural
reforms of 1958, financial flows in the only sector of the Soviet
economy that has no counterpart in any nonsocialist country have
become quite similar to those generated by the agriculture sector
in capitalist countries.
Financial flows not related to current household expenditures
generated by the population are relatively small. Since the discon-
tinuance of forced sales of government bonds in 1957, they
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'°Konnik has estimated that, while only 56 percent of the turnover tax was collected
from basic producers' goods industries in 1964, 88 percent of all capital investments were
made in that group of industries [48], p. 98. See also Hahn [119], Lavigne [128], Leptin
[130] and Seidenstrecher [144].
"At the same time, a large volume of transfers of investment funds between individual
industries may by-pass the budget. Thus, in 1969 the automobile industry required transfers
of funds amounting to 575 million rubles from other industries, while 800 million was
siphoned off from the electric power industry. These are large amounts compared with total
net fixed investment in industry.
Depreciation reserves not spent for capital maintenance and repair, profits and turnover
taxes periodically transferred into the budget, together with retained enterprise profits,
constitute what is known in Soviet planning as "financial accumulation." The concept is of
limited analytical value since it does not include all funds, such as those of the ko!khoz
sector, household savings, and a number of other sources available to meet investment
needs.Financial Flows of Enterprises 89
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Financial Flows of Enterprises
The restructuring of financial flows is the only significant change
that has occurred in the financial area in forty years.12 The
Reform has given the enterprise somewhat more autonomy in the
use of the profits it generates. Another important aspect of the
Reform is the role assigned to profits.
PROFITS SINCE THE REFORM
Profits are now expected to depend increasingly on decisions of
the enterprise manager and not on the proper execution of
detailed plans handed down from above. Profitability has become
a key criterion for the distribution of incentive rewards, but as a
guide for resource allocationithas acquired only limited
significance.
A lively discussion has been under way in the Soviet Union on
whether the profit ratio determining the size of the social product
should be related to labor inputs, to fixed capital only, or to
different variants of total production costs.
Higher profit retention is a related aspect of the Reform. One of
its main purposes is to induce individual enterprises to design
schemes for additional compensation that would offer meaningful
incentives to management and workers. The other is to enlarge,
withinlimits,theinvestmentindependenceofindividual
enterprises.
When actual profit and sales targets are exceeded the attached
rewards are relatively large, as payments into the government
budget on extra profits are at reduced rates and decline with the
rise in "unplanned profits." Profits in excess of the planned
targets expand retained earnings, permitting the manager to
undertake additional minor investments to spur productivity
and, within set limits,to raise the real income of workers
through improved fringe benefits and additional cash payments in
the form of various premiums.
However, a higher profit retention does not influence directly
the distribution of investments. In particular, on a macroeco-
nomic level, the higher profit rates in consumer goods have not
I
'2lhere have been some minor changes, such as the introduction of loans to finance
small-scale mechanization discussed in Chapter 6,Medium-term Credit."Payments and Financial FlowsI 90
resulted in a rechanneling of funds into this sector from pro-
ducer's goods industries, since overall economic targets are set
independently of profit considerations. The notion that invest-
ment decisions should be related to enterprise profits remains
irrelevant for the Soviet Union.
With regard to prices, the only flexibility available to plant
managers is to discontinue production of profitless or low-profit
items and to replace them with virtually identical products
embodying minor modifications, entitling the enterprise to submit
to the price-fixing authorities a request to set a higher price on the
"new" product. For example, by replacing a wooden frying pan
handle with a plastic one, or by moving a zipper on a blouse from
the back to the side, the enterprise can obtain a reclassification of
the product, and thereby a higher price tag. Thus, over time, the
price index is protected (since it is ostensibly based on standard
merchandise), while the enterprise improves its profitability.
With prices of inputs and outputs still fixed by outside author-
ity, improving productivity is the only way to increase profits.
Since the technological equipment of existing plants tends to be
frozen largely at the level of initial construction, although the new
system makes it easier to allocate funds for the acquisition of
superior and new technology, most of the improved productivity
must come from labor inputs, better management, and avoidance
of disruption in production due to such factors as breakdowns in
the flow of physical inputs and in equipment and unbalanced
inventories. Given these limitations, it is understandable that the
Reform was presented largely in terms of a new system of man-
agement rather than as a new approach to the restructuring of the
basic mechanism of the Soviet economy.
Furthermore, ministries and other higher-echelon administra-
tive units are not interested in enterprise profits alone but in the
performance of the whole set of overall indicators. Those
expressed in physical quantities remain of key importance, since
the goals of administrative units in charge of the economy, on the
national, regional, and local level, continue to be set in terms of
physical targets. Profit targets continue to be administratively set
as a percentage of total factor costs, and there is relatively little
fluctuation in this percentage among, and practically none within,
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Financial Flows of Enterprises 91
enterprise's activities has been reduced, with financial indicators
gaining prominence, higher economic authorities continue to
issue various kinds of binding directives to the enterprise, includ-
ing indicators (direktivnye pokazately) stipulated in real rather
than monetary terms.
In fact, the redefinition of targets appears to be a mere
formality for a large segment of output. This is particularly true of
goods contracted for in advance (typically, producers' goods and
defense industries), and of staple items (such as basic raw mate-
rials, fuel, building materials, and most food products) where
supply shortages are the rule and demand growth is secular. The
area in which the new system has led to greater responsiveness to
final demand, with the recognition that not all of the output may
be salable, or that it is salable only with price concessions, does
not seem to extend much beyond semidurable and durable con-
sumer goods.
Indeed, with factory prices fixed, total sales targets are actually
identical with targets previously specified in quantitative terms.
The important difference arises from calibrating the target on
goods actually sold rather than produced, and from the greater
flexibility in the composition of output. Enterprise managers have
been reluctant, however, to introduce new products requiring
radically new technology, while at the same time they have been
eager to make small changes in design that may enable them to
obtain upward price revisions. To combat management inertia in
promoting technology innovations, additional measures were
taken in July 1972 requiring enterprises to set specific sales targets
for new products "corresponding in technico-economic terms to
the highest domestic and foreign achievements."
Before the Reform, virtually all of an enterprise's profits went
to the budget, except for a very small statutory proportion
retained for designated special-purpose funds. Now profits are
distributed via three main channels according to their three main
functions: as a fiscal source, a source of fixed and working capital
for the enterprise, and a source of various special-purpose funds
"for stimulation" controlled by the enterprise. The distribution of
profits under the new system is summarized in Table 5.2.
The budget's share consists of three parts: charge on invested
capital, quasi rent ("fixed payments"), and a residual remaining92 Payments and Financial F/ott's
TABLE 5.2 Other uses ofr
Use of Profits After the Reform gaps in Special f
_______________________________________________________
other facilities
Payments into the Charge on fixed investment and allotted and, finally, toç
budget working capital previous period
Fixed payments (rentals)
Residual profits The various
fund," which
Planned expendiliires Financing of centrally planned capital between 1946
of the enterprise investment "enterprise fu Increase in working capital
Reserves for giving temporary financial profits to
assistance incentives had
Amortization of loans for financing fixed enterprise fund
investment
Amortization of loans for temporarily Enterprise man
supplementing own working capital planners to set
Absorption of losses in operating factory overfulfihlment.
housing and other facilities for the benefit of the simultaneo
targets, and faili
Formation of funds For material stimulation completely rem
for stimulation For socialist competition thatdiverse
For socio-cultural projects and dwelling
construction provided fori
For stimulating output of consumer goods benefits, were
For development of production ness as an ince
depending onI
NOTE: Profits are from the sale of output and some other sources, such as the
sale of redundant equipment. This list is adapted from Darkov and Maksimov profits were av2
[23], p. 103. Two of the
designed to
after all statutory deductions for funds that the enterprise can ment and worke
retain are made. On the whole, in many enterprises this residual is (b) as a reward
still quite large in relation to total profits.(It is, of course, "socialist
nonexistent in the case of enterprises with planned deficits which 5.2). The distri
receive subsidies, including those designed to nourish some of the and may vary
statutory "funds for stimulation," discussed below.) special criteria,
A second major portion of the profits goes to finance certain plan targets, ar
categories of fixed capital investment or to increase working claim for
capital. As illustrated in Table 5.2, such funds can be used either prices may be
(see Chapter 6) for projects that are centrally planned but financed cases, result in
from retained earnings, or to repay bank loans obtained in pre- Moreover, the i
vious years for such projects. Profits of a given year can be used
to finance not only current and past investments but also future 3See Alexandrov
investments by building up balances at the Investment Bank. 14[4], p.48.Financial Flows of Enterprises 93
Other uses of retained earnings are for bridging temporary flow
gaps in special funds for the payment of subsidies for housing and
other facilities built by the enterprise for the benefit of the staff,
and, finally, to expand working capital or repay loans obtained in
previous periods for this purpose.
The various "funds for stimulation" replace the "directors'
fund," which had existed before World War II, was reinstated
between 1946 and 1956, and was subsequently renamed the
"enterprise fund." Earlier attempts at using part of enterprise
profits to stimulate productivity by providing limited financial
incentives had little success. Payments into the directors' or
enterprise funds depended largely on overfulfihiment of the plan.
Enterprise managers were understandably interested in inducing
planners to set low targets in order to receive bonuses for "plan
overfulfihiment." Even so, payments into the fund depended on
the simultaneous achievement of a large number of specified
targets, and failure to achieve even one of them reduced, or even
completely removed, the prospects for a bonus. Finally, the fact
thatdiversepurposessuchasfinancinginvestmentnot
provided for in the plan and expenditures for collective staff
benefits, were met from the enterprise fund reduced its effective-
ness as an incentive to increase production.'3 Prior to the Reform,
depending on the industry,1to 6 percent of any additional
profits were available for this fund.
Two of the new incentive funds initiated under the Reform are
designed to distribute additional monetary rewards to manage-
ment and workers either (a) on the basis of a specified formula, or
(b) as a reward for exceptional performance entitling winners in
"socialist competition" to receive additional rewards (see Table
5.2). The distribution formula is set by each individual enterprise
and may vary from department to department. In some cases,
special criteria, different from those applied for the fulfilment of
plan targets, are used in determining an individual department's
claim for bonus payments, and shadow prices rather than official
prices may be used.14 Such bonus payments may, in certain
cases, result in significant additions to basic wages and salaries.
Moreover, the new arrangements also widen the distribution of
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such additional compensation to benefit the entire work force, not
only management and the professional staff, which had been
largely the case under the old system. Another fund provides for
fringe benefits in the form of staff facilities like factory housing,
kindergartens, children's camps, and vacations for workers at
nominal cost.
The third "development fund" can be used by the enterprise
itself for research expenditures, some limited product develop-
ment activities, and certain specified types of investment not
provided for in the plan.
Finally, enterprises are encouraged to make the widest possible
use of remainders and by-products that are likely to help over-
come shortages and that can be disposed of locally. The addi-
tional profits resulting from such operations are treated in a way
to stimulate their production further. The use of incentives is
discussed in more detail in a following section of this chapter.
The order in which profits are distributed among the budget, the
various funds, and the other recipients continues to be deter-
mined by administratively set priorities and allocation formulas.
The differentiations between the rules applying to planned profits
and those governing additional profits, as well as the special
procedures set up for enterprises requiring subsidies since their
plans anticipate losses rather than profits, were unaffected by the
Reform.
PAYMENTS TO THE BUDGET
As illustrated in Table 5.2, a portion of enterprise profits goes
to the budget as interest payments. Interest, under the name of
"charge on capital," is now charged on both fixed and working
capital. To equalize the cost of new and existing fixed capital
originally supplied on a grant basis, a charge has been inposed on
the depreciated value of capital assets in use at the time the new
system became applicable to an industry following the 1965
Reform. Enterprises that require subsidies ("planned deficit
units") are exempt from the capital use charge. The ancestry of
this charge can be traced to discussions during the NEP period. In
1922—1923 a proposal was made by the Commissariat (now Minis-
try of Finance) to introduce a capital use tax for all state-owned
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capital. A rate of 4 to 5 percent was discussed at the time.'5 While
the charge on capital is applied to gross profits, it is a cost factor in
setting prices. It may be regarded as a property tax, or, alterna-
tively, as the minimum socially acceptable rate of return on
productive assets (capital use tax), or as the minimum share of
government in enterprise profits.'6 Its introduction affected the
rate of profits in individual industries and for the economy as a
whole.
The question of what the proper level and structure of charges
on invested funds should be is far from resolved. In the first full
year of the Reform rates were set uniformly at 6 percent, but in
the following year (1967) they varied within a range of 3 to 10
percent for individual industries.'7 The whole problem of the
proper charge for capital, its relation to planned profits, and the
disposition of such profits, including the determination of the
share to be retained for the "funds for stimulation," is still being
hotly debated, and competing schemes are being put forward,18
including proposals for differential rates between branches of the
same industry and even between individual enterprises.
The existence of quasi rents is recognized by the introduction
of a rental ("fixed") payment with a rate set for fairly long periods
in advance in each case when it is levied. Given the divergence of
profit rates in individual industries, the ratio of this rental pay-
ment to total costs varies widely. Differential rents are fixed either
as a percentage of sales or as a fixed amount per unit of output,
and tend to equalize the production cost of each enterprise.
In effect, these fixed rents are akin to the turnover tax, except
that they are imposed on an enterprise (or entire industry or
industry branch) rather than on a product basis. They tend to
equalize net profits among individual units within the same indus-
try, where otherwise, with pricing on the basis of average indus-
try costs, enterprises enjoying natural, locational, or technologi-
cal advantages would obtain a higher profit rate and therefore
retain a greater share of profits.
The introduction of the capital use and rental charges, while
reducing the amount collected under the heading of "remaining
'5See Mitel'rnan [1941 and Decaillot [228].
'6tpatov [411, p. 20.
'7Tulebaev [88], p. 13.
'8See, for instance, Brazovskaya [170] and the literature quoted therein.96 Payments and Financial Flows
profit," has not changed the total share of profits in the economy
going to the budget. Payments for capital use and quasi rents are a
relatively small part of profits as calculated prior to the Reform.
They do not depend on changes in sales or profitability which
affect "remaining profits" only. The share of profits retained by
the enterprise is determined under the new system by the net
profits, defined as profits measured by "accounting profitability,"
from which fixed rental payments and capital use payments are
deducted.
The Reform had only a very slight overall effect on the sources
of budgetary income and on the structure of expenditures. In 1971
the share of national income channeled into the budget was
essentially the same (52.7 percent) as in the year the Reform was
initiated (52.9 percent in 1965). The budgetary receipts derived
from payments by the socialized sector of the economy remained
very close to the old level (91.1 percent, compared with 91.8
percent in 1965); and the expenditures for the economy, over-
whelmingly for investment purposes, rose (from 45.7 percent in
1965 to 48.9 percent in 1971), in spite of all the emphasis on
decentralized investments from profits retained by individual
enterprises. 19
FINANCING FIXED CAPITAL INVESTMENT
Financing fixed capital investment from budgetary resources on
a nonreturnable grant basis under the standard system had
involved considerable misallocation of resources and costly
delays in the completion of construction projects. Since the
Reform, the financing of fixed investment has been gradually
shifting toward a combination of retained enterprise profits,
depreciation reserves and bank loans. If and when this process is
accelerated, the proportion of national income redistributed
through the budget will tend to decline, and that of self-invest-
ment and bank loans, to increase.
The ultimate objective of the new arrangement is to achieve a
more rational pattern of investment in productive capital and a
reduction in investment in relation to output. If the Reform is to
be more than a substitution of control mechanisms, financial
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processes must acquire new functions. The significant question
is, therefore, whether the functional relationship of the financial
system to resource allocation and profit maximization is being
changed. Thus far, central accumulation and allocation of invest-
ment resources has remained largely unimpaired, though imple-
mentation is shifted to a multichannel system of fund flows which,
among other things, reduces the circuitous flow of resources
between the units that generate them.
Changes in the flow of investment funds (including depreciation
reserves) and credit are bound to have some effect on patterns of
real investment, inventory behavior, and the producers' price
structure, and thus on consumer welfare. The broad question is,
therefore, whether reforms in the area of financing will tend to
raise efficiency of investment, accelerate the rate of real output
growth, and improve the relative apportionment of the increased
output between consumers and the state.
One change that received considerable publicity when the
Reform was announced involved (a) shifting fixed investment
financing from grants to repayable loans,20 and (b) permitting
individual enterprises to retain a greater share of profits and depre-
ciation reserves in a move toward greater decentralization of
investment. However, greater decentralization of investment
funds does not necessarily mean greater decentralization of deci-
sion making. Investment decisions remain largely centralized in
the bureaucratic hands of the planning agencies, industrial minis-
tries, and the glavks and their organizational successors. Even
most of the resources of the decentralized enterprise funds must
still be spent on centrally planned investment.21 The state contin-
ues to control the level and the broad distribution of investments.
(Since 1971, the upper limit of investment is set by the relevant
ministries of the various republics, depending on who supervises
the individual enterprise. In the new scheme of things, there is no
more room than under the old system for anything even remotely
resembling a capital market. The principal channel for enterprise
initiative is "arguing it out" with the supervisory and planning
20Partial shifting to loan financing of investment in fixed capital had been under
discussion since at least 1957.
211n 1965, for instance, 38.7 percent of all centrally planned investment was financed
from enterprise resources. See Poskonov [70]. For a detailed discussion of the various
kinds of enterprise funds which, under the. standard system, could be used to finance
decentralized investments, see [93], pp. 37—41.98 Payments and Financial Flows
authorities. The bulk of investment designed to increase existing
plant capacity and investments involving a variety of minor proj-
ects remain centrally planned but no longer necessarily grant-
financed. Loan financing of part of all such projects by the state
and by the Investment Bank will gradually lead to the formation
of revolving loan funds by the latter and reduce the need for
giving them additional resources from the national budget.
Grants from the budget continue to be made not only for social
overhead investments like schools and hospitals, but also for such
priority projects as new industries, large plants (such as those in
the automotive industry), and major programs for the develop-
ment of national resources. In principle, they are to be limited to
large de novo projects, designed to change the structure of pro-
duction and the geographic distribution of industry, to introduce
new technology, to open up major new sources of raw materials,
and to construct important hydro-electrical projects. Needless to
say, all defense-related investments, as well as those connected
with atomic energy and space programs, continue to be budget-
financed. While these expenditures are never mentioned in Soviet
literature, they are no doubt subject to rules different from those
applying to other investments, and what changes, if any, the
Reform has brought.
The change in the channeling of investment funds between 1965
and 1971 can only be described as modest. In 1971, 59 percent of
total profits in all branches of the economy still went to the
Treasury, as against 70 percent in 1965 (and only 64 percent in
1960). During the same period, the percentage retained for invest-
ment purposes rose from 10 to 13 percent—not much above the
1960 level of 12 percent. In money terms, the increase amounted
to about 8 billion rubles. Depreciation allowances rose from 18.8
billion rubles to 32.1 billion, of which half were retained by
enterprises each year for plant maintenance. Thus, the total fund
for investments available internally rose. Some part of retained
profits had to be invested in centrally planned projects, however.
As a result, the amount that individual enterprises can expend
independently for capital projects, including those required to
upgrade technology, and even for maintenance and repairs has
not been significantly increased. It remains to be seen whether
profits put at the disposal of the newly created associations of
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tions of enterprises which retain a large amount of independence,
will contribute to greater decentralization of fixed investment
decisions.
Long-term loans (outstanding at year's end) for investment
purposes in the six-year period rose only by 6.3 billion rubles
despite their tenfold increase from the 0.7 billion level at the end
of 1965 •22 This roughly 21 billion expansion in retained profits,
depreciation allowances, and loans compared with an increase by
35.5 billion in budgetary expenditures for the economy, over-
whelmingly for fixed investment purposes. Thus, so far, the gap
between announced objective and actual performance remains
very wide; the share of centrally directed investments may have
actually increased rather than decreased since the Reform was
launched.
During the last ten years prior to the Reform, retained profits
available for "decentralized investments" amounted to only
about 2 percent of total new investments in the Soviet economy.
While the Reform undoubtedly gave enterprises greater finan-
cial control over their own capital investment, it did so without
simultaneously improving the availability of real resources to
implement this more decentralized investment. This fact consti-
tutes one of the principal limitations of the Reform. For it is clear
that the one major reason for changes in investment financing had
been to help solve one of the main problems of capital formation
in the Soviet Union—the chronic immobilization of resources in
uncompleted construction projects and hoarded building sup-
plies23 and the lack of pressure to complete individual projects
as rapidly as possible.
22Computed from [861, 1972, pp.465. 466,480, and 486. These figures relatetothe entire
economy,excluding kolkhozes,andthus include state farms, municipal enterprises, et ce-
tera. Separate data for manufacturing are not available.
231n many cases, plant managers have been unable to find contractors willing to take on
additional jobs since their resources were already fully committed to major projects
approved by central authorities and were included in lists of eligible projects. See Petra-
kov [197],p.181. Thus, in the third full year after the initiation of the Reform,
enterprises which had switched to the "new system of economic steering" were able
to spend only 47 percent of the funds earmarked for housing and the construction of
social and cultural facilities such as clubs and movie theatres. Only 58percentof their total
"fundsfor economic stimulation" were spent in that year. In 1969, only 85 percent of all
construction scheduled to be completed was actually finished. Lack of funds and other
shortcomings in planning and execution account for the shortfall. See Kartashova [179]. At
the beginning of 1971 incompleted construction of retail stores in rural areas exceeded the
value of a full year's investment. See Sotnikov [2051.100 Paymentsand Financial Flows
Project completion was delayed by many factors prior to the
Reform. Since performance was measured in terms of gross value
of work performed (construction put in place) rather than value
added, subcontracting construction firms tended to give prefer-
ence to those operations that yielded the largest "work per-
formed" figures, with the result that the flow of many projects
was much delayed.24 Another factor was poor coordination
between construction and equipment delivery schedules, as well
as the tendency to place contracts for equipment in excess of
financial resources available.25
To remedy this situation, the Reform has instituted moves
designed to increase financial incentives for the completion of
projects. Prior to 1965, payments were made as a rule for each
individual job (in 1954,forinstance, to the extent of 95 percent of
all disbursements) irrespective of whether it resulted in additional
operating capacity. One of the ways in which the Reform began to
use financial levers was to make partial progress payments depen-
dent on the percentage of scheduled operating capacity com-
pleted. In a more radical step, in some cases progress payments
on each phase of a construction job completed have been replaced
by a system under which the Investment Bank pays the contract-
ing firm only after the completed plant is ready for delivery, but
by 1972 only a small part of all projects financed was subject to
this procedure.
Other shortcomings of the standard system, such as interrup-
tion of construction because of inadequate financial planning, 26
are to be remedied in a variety of ways. Projects requiring bank
financing must now submit flow-of-funds projections to document
availability of funds over the entire period of construction and
loan amortization and penalty rates are charged when loans are
not amortized on schedule.
Despite these measures, there is little evidence that the Reform
24BeIkin and Inventor [13] have estimated that projects in process of completion absorb
50 percent more resources than would be required if their average time of construction was
comparable to average U.S. performance.
25For a fairly candid discussion of reasons behind the inefficiency of the construction
industry and of the attempts of the Investment and State Banks to foster improvements, see
Yunik [91], pp. 13ff. and pp. 133—135.
26Poskonov [70], p. 260. Immediately prior to the Reform (1964—1965), the average cost
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has succeeded in improving the chronic problem of failure of
investment projects to be completed on time.
ENTERPRISE FINANCES AND THE REFORM
Has the enterprise made real strides toward greater autonomy
under the Reform? There are no easy answers to this question. It
is not clear to what extent any of the moves toward autonomy
have been actually implemented in various industries. The crea-
tion of associations of enterprises (ob'edineniye) 27 represents a
substitution of administrative authorities interposed between the
enterprise and the industrial ministry (such as glavk). Their crea-
tion does not necessarily mean more autonomy for the enterprise,
since they can possibly also result in the transfer to the associa-
tion of some decisions previously left with the enterprise man-
ager. It is not clear as yet whether enterprises have, on balance,
won at the expense of the top and intermediate levels of the
economic hierarchy.
Reducing circuitous channeling of investment funds means an
increase in funds retained by enterprises, and a shift to credit on
turnover simplifies their short-term credit relations with the State
Bank. It must be kept in mind, however, that the financial flexibil-
ity of managers in dealing with the funds retained by the enter-
prise has been increased only within narrow limits.28 Further-
more, retained enterprise funds can still be transfered to other
enterprises (decree of February 12, 1966) under ill-defined condi-
tions at the discretion of higher-level economic administrations.29
Nevertheless, funds subject to management control are normally
accumulated in segregated bank accounts pending disbursement,
and enough of these temporary accumulations seep into the gen-
270b'edineniveisan association of enterprises, usually within the same industry and
recion. Et represents a standard administrative level between the glavkandan individual
enterprise. (It corresponds to the 'trust" in earlier periods of administrative organization.)
On the arrangements for the extension of credit to associations, see Stundyuk [2061.
28For example, with trade union approval, up to 20 percent of funds allocated to the
bonus fund can be used for fringe benefits (such as factory housing construction), and vice
versa. See Chistyakov, 'The New System of Stimulation Funds and their Role in Increas-
ing Ef'ficiencv of Production." in Alexandrov 141. p. 56.
29Eidonova, 'Profits, Rentability, and Their Role in Encreasing Efficiency of Produc-
tion," in Alexandrov [4], p. 36. Examples are given where profits were transferred in their
entirety to other enterprises supervised by the same ministry.102 Payments and Financial Flows
era! cash balances of the enterprise to offer various possibilities
for escaping constraints imposed by planners and controllers.
Moreover, ministries and other economic authorities (such as
glavks) can act as intermediaries, borrowing from the Bank and
making credit available to individual enterprises for the purpose
of retiring funds borrowed to bring working capital up to required
levels. The same authorities can also remove the need for borrow-
ing either by replenishing working capita! through transfers from
other enterprises under their supervision or by simply lowering
the working capital requirements (norms) they impose.3°
As a result of the Reform, funds of enterprises designated as
"internal resources" have increased in relation to their working
capital. Such "temporarily available funds," which are not con-
sidered part of the "owned working capital," include, in addition
to retained profits earmarked for various specific purposes but not
as yet actually expended, also (a) profits payable into the budget
but not yet actually transferred (these transfers, as well as those
to the Investment Bank for the financing of centrally planned
investments, are being currently made only three times a month,
at roughly ten day intervals), as well as (b) a large part of accounts
payable. It was estimated at the beginning of 1971 that such
"internal resources" constituted about one-fifth of the total
working capita! of state enterprises; less than one-third of these
internal resources were at that time actually taken into account in
financial planning (as ustoichivye passivy—' 'stable liabilities"),
so that the individual enterprises had a certain flexibility in using
the remainder. A special investigation conducted by the Central
Statistical Office (TsSU) as of January 1, 197!, revealed that 70
percent of these "unplanned internal financial resources" were
actually used for bridging various shortages in funds resulting
from situations not foreseen in financial plans, thus obviating the
need for unplanned bank loans or other outside assistance. Typi-
cal uses of such resources included financing of inventories not
eligible for bank loans, meeting expenditures for which resources
provided in the enterprise's financial plan did not actually mater-
ialize, and reducing accounts payable.3'
30See Kartashova [43].
31See Agraponov [160] and Shermenev [75].
Enterprise balance sheets also show a certain amount of resources provided by creditors
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Greater profit retention and the extension of credit on turnover
have increased average cash balances of enterprises with the
State Bank (which prior to the Reform averaged 4 to 5 percent of
working capital). They have somewhat reduced the need for
short-term credit, and have provided enterprises more opportu-
nity for maneuvering in spite of the existing safeguards against the
use of funds accumulated for purposes other than those specified.
The level and structure of bank interest rates apparently do not
encourage loan repayment before maturity, while abolition of the
payment of interest on free balances encourages their use for
unauthorized purposes if the vigilance of the controllers of the
State Bank can be circumvented.32
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
Before the Reform, enterprises had very limited opportunities
for technical modernization, and few incentives existed to stimu-
late efforts in that direction. The Reform recognizes that financial
incentives on an individual as well as on a group (team or enter-
prise) basis are indispensable for increasing efficiency and stimu-
lating initiative leading to cost reductions and generally improved
performance.
Bonuses can be paid for.a variety of reasons. The precise basis
on which such payments are made is fixed by the director of the
enterprise, ostensibly with the participation of the trade union
committee. The premium schemes of individual enterprises may
cover individual workers and members of the technical and mana-
gerial staff as well as groups of workers, such as departments or
teams ("brigades"), including premiums for winners of intrafac-
tory competition for superior performance, known as "socialist
competition." The resources for such premiums are derived from
savings achieved in "planned" payrolls as well as from the var-
ious premium funds (see section above, "Profits Since the
category are float (bills in the process of collection), contested bills, as well as bills due for
which settlement credit was not available to the buyer and which may be considered as
trade credit. The percentage of total amounts due from creditors (including drafts in the
process of collection) in total working capital varies by industry, over time and for
individual enterprises within an industry, but usually averages between 8 and 12 percent.
32This is shown by Lisitsian [188] and [189] on the basis of several sample surveys. One
survey of machine building enterprises shows that the special funds for the stimulation of
the staff and for decentralized investment accounted for 15 percent of total "nonplanned
expenditures" on January 1, 1966, but for as much as 47.3 percent on October 1, 1969.104 Payments and Financial Flows
Reform").All premium schemes require approval by the
supervising economic administration and must be within the limits
set by the Council of Ministers for each industry.33
To increase the effectiveness of incentives, the profit funds
earmarked for additional employee compensation are made avail-
able, although in reduced amounts, even if individual plan targets
are not achieved, while under the old system no premiums were
payable unless all targets were met.34
There is little evidence to indicate that the main objective of the
new financial incentives has been achieved. After nearly a decade
of discussion and considerable experimentation, no satisfactory
way has been found to find a workable bonus system that would
heighten the staff's interest in raising productivity and introducing
new technology. The new system of determining bonuses retains
the earlier procedures. No mechanism has emerged that would
automatically make factory workers and various levels of techni-
cal, managerial, and administrative personnel strive for more
efficient use of existing equipment, the introduction of superior
technology, and for the elimination of bottlenecks due to
resources immobilized in construction or the distribution process.
Instead, a new, rigid system of bonuses has been combined with
the previous one. Moreover, neither the bureaucracy of the
higher-level economic administrations (glavks, for example), on
whose initiative, or at least approval, technological and managerial
progress depends, nor the staff of the State Bank and the Invest-
ment Bank participate in the new system of incentives. These
groups may derive some satisfaction from the fact that the targets
they set, the norms they determine, and the repayment schedules
they impose are possibly met with greater regularity than before.
But their interest remains in playing safe by setting targets low
enough to show "overfuiflllment," and by refraining from innova-
tions that contain the risk of something going wrong.
One of the generally recognized effects of the Reform has been
a greater seepage of profits into labor compensation. With profit-
related bonuses becoming a significant part of money income,
"Up to 20 percent of the resources accruing to the three individual funds for stimulation
can be reallocated during the year. See Belobzhetsky [1691. See also Leeman 12431.
34Slavnyi [791, p. 35.Onthe rules governing the formation of funds for stimulation in
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control of payroll disbursement has proved an insufficient means
of planning and balancing real flows of consumer goods and of
money incomes. As a result of the broader use of bonuses and
other changes introduced by the Reform, in some industries labor
income hasincreased more rapidlythanproductivity. To
counteract the resulting inflationary pressures, measures have
been taken to transfer to the "fund for social and cultural pur-
poses" at least part of the funds that should have automatically
become available for individual bonus payments under the
Reform, or, alternatively, to postpone their disbursement to the
following year.35
By 1971, manufacturing enterprises were distributing more than
4.1 billion rubles in bonuses, and, if the "funds for stimulation"
were distributed proportionately in the other branches of the
economy, the total disbursed by all state enterprises must have
been near 5.4 billion rubles. Interestingly enough, the amount
accumulated for this purpose but not yet disbursed at the end of
1971 in manufacturing alone amounted to nearly two-thirds of the
sum actually paid out. By comparison, the two funds carried over
from pre-Reform years (premiums for "socialist competition"
and for creating and introducing new technology) yielded only 36
million and 586 million rubles, respectively, in all state enter-
prises.36 Once the provisions of the Reform are fully and gener-
ally implemented and the financial incentives have had their full
effect on productivity, as much as one-fifth of the total compensa-
tion of employees is expected to come from the incentive fund,
with perhaps a more than proportionate share going to the engi-
neering and management group.37
35There are indicationsthat,despite the new emphasis on consumer goods, their output
hasbeen lagging behind effective household demand, and shortages for specific geographic
areas persist. This was particularly true in 1968 and 1969. when payrolls increased at a more
rapid rate than productivity, partly as a result of a general upward revision of wage scales.
The various old and new problems slowing down expansion of services to consumers also
revealed themselves again. See Smirnov [81], p. 84 and Zverev [931. While during the three
years preceding the Reforrn(1963—l965) annual increases in consumer services exceeded
that in consumer goods by about 15 percent, in 1967—1969 the value of services grew less
than that of goods available to consumers. See Slavnyi [203].
1972, pp. 478 and
"The new provisions for worker compensation affect almost exclusively production
workers, whose share in the labor force has been declining mainly as a result of the growth
of nonmanufacturing industries. The percentage of nonproduction workers in the labor
force, only 11.7 percent in 1940, had risen to 20 percent by 1965 and has doubtless
increased since. Slavnyi [791, p. 15.